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Abstract – Modern world builds on the resilience of interdependent infrastructures characterized
as complex networks. Recently, a framework for analysis of interdependent networks has been
developed to explain the mechanism of resilience in interdependent networks. Here we extend
this interdependent network model by considering flows in the networks and study the system’s
resilience under different attack strategies. In our model, nodes may fail due to either overload
or loss of interdependency. Under the interaction between these two failure mechanisms, it is
shown that interdependent scale-free networks show extreme vulnerability. The resilience of in-
terdependent SF networks is found in our simulation much smaller than single SF network or
interdependent SF networks without flows.
Introduction. – Over the past decade, network the-
ory has become one of the major tools in studying complex
systems, and has been proved useful for the description
and analysis of complex systems in various fields [1–11].
As one of the most fundamental questions, the resilience
of networks has been studied intensively, which helps to
provide efficient solutions to protect real networks against
faults or attacks [12–16]. However, most of these studies
are based on the assumption that networks are isolated,
neglecting the interdependency between them. Recently,
Buldyrev et al. presented a theory of interdependent net-
works. In their work, a mutual percolation model is pro-
posed to study the vulnerability of network of networks
where the links between the networks are interdependency
links [17]. This has initiated a series of studies about var-
ious interdependent networks. Parshani et al. proposed a
theoretical framework for studying the case of partially in-
terdependent networks by defining the coupling strength q.
Their findings showed that reducing the coupling strength
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leads to a change from first to second order percolation
transition [18]. Gao et al. has generalized the theory on
network of networks, showing that the percolation theory
of a single network is a limiting case of this generalization
[19–21].
Interdependency does exist between various networks
for transferring flows including airlines, urban road net-
works, Internet and power grid [22–28]. The failure of net-
work components, either by random breakdown or inten-
tional attacks, could change the balance of flows causing
overloads and trigger the cascading failures, which prob-
ably ends up with catastrophes [12, 13, 29–33]. In single
networks, Motter et al. presented a model to consider a
cascade of overload failures [12,13]. In this paper, we gen-
eralize it to interdependent networks, study their resilience
against cascading failures caused by both overloads and
by loss of interdependency under random or intentional
attack strategies. Firstly we study the resilience of inter-
dependent scale-free networks under different attacks and
explore in detail how the resilience depend on scaling ex-
ponent γ of degree distributions. Secondly, we study how
the interdependent Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks respond to dif-
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ferent attack strategies. Finally, we perform a study to
understand the effect of interdependency q on the coupled
networks resilience.
The Model. – In our model, we assume for sim-
plicity that the coupled networks, A and B, have the
same size NA = NB = N and same degree distribution,
PA(k) = PB(k). q quantifies the fraction of nodes hav-
ing interdependency link to networks B. Each node in
network A depends only on one node in network B and
vice versa, which establishes a one-to-one bidirectional de-
pendent relation. The one-to-one bidirectional dependent
links are established randomly to avoid any correlations
among the two networks. In the iterative failure process,
if node Ai stops functioning due to attack or overload fail-
ure, node Bi which depends on Ai stops functioning as
well, and vice versa. The load quantifies the amount of
flows that a node is requested to transmit and is consid-
ered to depend on the total number of shortest paths pass-
ing through it [34–36]. The load of node i can be denoted
by
L(i) =
∑
(v1,v2)
σv1,v2(i)
σv1,v2
i = 1, 2, · · · , N (1)
Where σv1,v2 is the total number of shortest paths between
node v1 and v2, σv1,v2(i) is the number of shortest paths
between node v1 and v2 through node i.
Following Ref. [12], the capacity of node i is denoted by
C(i) = (1 + α) ∗ L0(i) i = 1, 2, · · · , N (2)
Where α is the tolerance parameter, and L0(i) is the initial
load of node i. A node is failed when its load exceeds the
capacity.
If we remove intentionally (’attack’) some nodes in net-
work A, firstly it will induce cascading failure by the re-
distribution of loads among the nodes in network A. Here
we assume that only the nodes in the giant component
remain functional. The failed nodes may disintegrate net-
work A and all nodes outside the giant component will
cause their dependency counterparts in network B to fail.
These failed nodes in network B will cause overloads and
more nodes to fail. This process will continue recursively
until no further damage is produced either by overloads
or by interdependency losses. In our model, the links be-
tween network A and B only reflect the dependence re-
lationship. It is different from reference [37], where links
between network A and B is used for traffic process.
Different attack strategies have been studied in iso-
lated networks with or without considering overloads Refs.
[12, 13, 38–43]. We here focus on three different attack
strategies: (i) remove the node with highest load; (ii) re-
move the node with largest degree; (iii) remove a node
randomly. We compare here these three different strate-
gies.
Results . – Now we present numerical simulations
obtained for different attack strategies on interdependent
ER networks (ER-ER) and interdependent scale-free net-
works (SF-SF) with flows. To generate SF-SF networks,
we use the method mentioned in Ref. [7]. By this method,
we could compare SF network with different scaling expo-
nent γ by fixing the average degree < k >. The relative
size of the largest connected component G = N ′/N is
used to quantify the network resilience, where N and N ′
are the size of largest component before and after cascad-
ing respectively. Considering the computation cost from
overload calculation, the network size in the simulation is
NA = NB = 5000. We intentionally remove one node with
the highest load or the largest degree, which are compared
with random removal. After the initial attack, node can
fail in a domino-like process due to either overload inside
one network or loss of interdependency between two net-
works. Therefore, the cascading failure process is more
complicated in the interdependent networks when these
two failure mechanisms are interacting and receiving dif-
ferent feedback.
We begin the study with interdependent scale-free net-
works. It is shown in Fig. 1 that intentional attack makes
more damage to interdependent networks than random
removal. Interdependent scale-free network with γ = 3
is found to be more vulnerable than other interdependent
networks (γ = 2.3 and 4.7). Due to the correlation be-
tween degree and load [35], the attack based on nodes’
degree is found in our study as harmful as attack based
on nodes’ load. In the following we will not specify the
attack types (based on degree or load) when we refer to
attack.
Network heterogeneity is found to be one of the main
causes for cascading failures [38]. The scaling exponent γ
of scale-free network with degree distribution P (k) ∼ k−γ
can characterize the heterogeneity in the degree distribu-
tion. We study the interdependent scale-free network re-
silience against attacks with different γ values in Fig. 2.
It is shown in Fig. 2 (a) that for 2.5 < γ < 3.7 of interde-
pendent scale-free network with average degree < k >≈ 4,
intentional attack on one node with highest degree (load)
will induce the full collapse of the whole interdependent
networks. Even random removal will cause network dam-
age over 60%. This demonstrates the extreme network
vulnerability as a result of interaction between two fail-
ure mechanisms: overloads and interdependency losses.
For < k >≈ 4 we found that there exists a ’valley’ of γ
between 2.5 and 3.7 where interdependent network gets
minimal resilience. Under random removal, network also
reached its minimal resilience around γ = 3. For larger
tolerance α = 0.9 in Fig. 2 (c), similar pattern has also
been found with a smaller range of the valley for minimal
network resilience, where G is comparatively large due to
larger system tolerance α.
In order to check if this pattern depends on average de-
gree, we increase the average degree largely (< k >≈ 14).
With the finding of a narrow ’valley’ of γ, it is suggested
in Fig.2 (b) and (d) that interdependent SF networks can
preserve larger fraction after attacks and become more ro-
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Fig. 1: The relative size of giant component G of a system of
on interdependent SF networks as a function of the tolerance
parameters α, when NA = NB = 5000, < k >≈ 4 and q=1
for three different scaling exponents γ under different attack
strategies.
bust for large average degree. Effect of large degree can
be interpreted as increase of redundancy of paths between
pairs, which release the pressure of overloads. Comparing
the results shown in Fig. 2 (a)-(d), the resilience of interde-
pendent network depends significantly on γ values and av-
erage degree < k > of the degree distribution P (k) ∼ k−γ .
Compared with single network, the study will help us
to identify the effect of interaction between two failure
mechanisms in interdependent networks. For single net-
works (coupling strength q = 0 in our model) in Fig. 2 (e)
and (f), the intentional attack can make much less damage
to single network compared the interdependent networks
in Fig. 2 (a) and (b). The difference is also very signifi-
cant for random removal, which causes almost no damage
to single network. Without the interaction of two failure
mechanisms, the single network becomes more robust than
the interdependent networks.
For the homogeneous (ER) interdependent networks,
Figure. 3 shows that when α = 0, removing one node will
break down the whole system, no matter which kind of
strategy the removal is based on. At α = 0.1, it is shown
that targeted attacks could damage the largest connected
component by more than 90%. As the tolerance α in-
creases further (above 0.25), the removal strategies will
hardly trigger a significant breakdown in the networks. It
is suggested that the resilience of interdependent ER net-
works changes more abruptly as α increases compared to
interdependent SF networks, where narrow betweenness
distribution may be the major cause.
After discussing the process of cascading failures in the
fully interdependent ER networks and interdependent SF
networks with flows, we perform simulations for the case
of partial coupling strength q < 1. In Fig. 4,we present
numerical results of the largest component G as a function
of α in interdependent scale-free networks under random
and intentional attack. It is shown that the network re-
silience is very sensitive to the interdependency between
networks, where interdependency can decrease the net-
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Fig. 2: (a) The relative size of giant component G of inter-
dependent SF networks as a function of the scaling exponents
γ, when NA = NB = 5000, < k >≈ 4 and q = 1 for the
tolerance parameter α = 0.3 under different attack strategies.
(b) The relative size of giant component G of interdependent
SF networks as a function of the scaling exponents γ, when
NA = NB = 5000, < k >≈ 14 and q = 1 for the tolerance
parameter α = 0.3 under different attack strategies. For small
degree (< k >≈ 4), there exits a ’valley’ of γ, while this valley
becomes smaller for large degree (< k >≈ 14). Similar pattern
has also found for α = 0.9 and single networks q = 0. (c) All
the parameters other than α = 0.9 are the same as (a). (d) All
the parameters other than α = 0.9 are the same as (b). (e) All
the parameters other than q = 0 are the same as (a). (f) All
the parameters other than q = 0 are the same as (b).
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Fig. 3: The relative size of giant component G of interdepen-
dent ER networks as a function of the tolerance parameter α,
when NA = NB = 5000, < k >= 4 and q=1 under different
attack strategies.
p-3
Peng Zhang et al.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.00.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
α
G
 
 
q=0.0 random
q=0.0 degree
q=0.1 random
q=0.1 degree
q=0.3 random
q=0.3 degree
q=0.7 random
q=0.7 degree
q=1.0 random
q=1.0 degree
Fig. 4: The relative size of giant component G of interdepen-
dent SF networks as a function of the tolerance parameter α,
when NA = NB = 5000, < k >≈ 4 and γ=2.3 for four differ-
ent coupling strength q under random and intentional attack
strategies.
work resilience. It is suggested again that interaction be-
tween overloads and loss of interdependency changes the
network resilience qualitatively.
Conclusion. – Modern complex networks for trans-
porting different flows become more and more dependent
on each other. In this paper, we examine the resilience of
interdependent networks with flows under random faults
and intentional attacks. During the failure processes of in-
terdependent network, there are two possible failure mech-
anisms: overloads and loss of interdependency. These two
mechanisms may amplify each other sometimes, they may
slow down each other under some conditions. For example,
the nodes removed due to interdependency loss can release
the pressure on the network flow and may even reduce the
overloads [13]. Due to this complicated interaction be-
tween overloads and interdependency loss, interdependent
scale-free networks are found to have distinct resilience
properties from interdependent networks without flows.
For interdependent SF networks with degree distribution
P (k) ∼ k−γ , network resilience is not changing monotoni-
cally with their scaling exponent γ, where a valley of min-
imal network resilience exists in a range of γ values. The
resilience of interdependent SF networks is found in our
simulation much smaller than single SF network or inter-
dependent SF networks without flows. For interdependent
ER networks, the resilience changes abruptly possibly due
to their narrow betweenness distribution. We believe that
further study of interaction between overloads and interde-
pendency losses during the cascading failures processes is
an essential step towards fully understanding the resilience
of interdependent transportation networks.
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